Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) can significantly increase the elasticity of residential electricity demand. This elasticity can be employed to shape the daily aggregated electricity demand profile of a system comprised of a large number of residential PEVs' users sharing one electricity retailer or an aggregator. In this paper, we propose a joint demand shaping and altering algorithm for managing vehicle-to-grid (V2G) enabled PEVs' electricity assignments (charging and discharging) in order to diminish the overall electricity procurement costs for a retailer bidding to two-settlement electricity markets, i.e., a day-ahead (DA) and a real-time (RT) market. This approach is decentralized, scalable, fast converging and does not violate users' privacy. Our simulations' results demonstrate significant overall cost savings (up to 28%) for a retailer bidding to an operational electricity market by using our proposed algorithm. This mechanism becomes even more salient when the power system is integrating a large number of intermittent energy resources wherein RT demand altering is crucial due to more likely contingencies and hence more RT price fluctuations and even more so-called black swan events. Lower electricity procurement cost for a retailer finally makes it able to offer better deals to customers and expand its market capacity. This implies that customers can enjoy lower electricity bills as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ambitious targets and attractive incentives for introducing plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) into the transport sector have been set in many countries [1] . In fact, the roadmap is that industries and governments attain an overall PEV/PHEV sales share of at least 50% for light duty vehicle (LDV) sales globally by 2050 [2] , see Fig. 1 .
A generic wholesale electricity market is comprised of electricity markets such as spot and forward markets for trading electricity or active power, and ancillary service markets for guaranteeing security in the provision. In a deregulated electricity system, electricity retailers submit demand bids to wholesale electricity markets. For instance, for a day-ahead (DA) electricity market, these demand bids often have both power demand's amounts and price components meaning that the retailer purchases the specified power amount only if the market clearing price (MCP) is not more than the price Fig. 1 : An estimated profile of the shares for various passenger LDV sales (million) by 2050 [2] . component [3] . This bidding can be carried out in a few predefined rounds allowing the retailers to update their bids at each round before final clearance. This type of bidding is referred to as limit order bidding. Therefore, in this case, it is admissible to presume that a retailer is willing to shape its aggregated demand profile and match it to the electricity profile resulted from successful bids for different hours of the following day so that it can minimize its demand from the RT market to balance the load, and accordingly reduce the overall electricity procurement cost for each following day.
Based on Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) interconnection pricing data for the year 2014 [4] , the average price of electricity per MWh which has been sold over that year is very close for both DA and RT markets, i.e., $48.9539 and $48.2063, respectively. Furthermore, although fluctuations occur frequently in the markets, mean reversion theory suggests that prices and returns finally proceed back towards the mean or the average. This mean or average can be the historical average of the price or return or simply another admissible average [5] . However, we observe that hourly pricing data for PJM's DA and RT markets can be significantly distinct and unpredictable at some days and/or hours. Hence, the high uncertainty, particularly in the RT market, can remarkably impact the overall electricity procurement cost for a retailer. This point becomes even more salient when the power system is relying on a large number of intermittent energy resources, e.g., wind farms and solar panels, since more RT price fluctuations and even so-called black swan events [6] may be occurred.
In [7] , we have provided a statistical modelling and a closed-form expression for PEVs' uncoordinated charging demand. Furthermore, in [8] we propose a decentralized demand shaping algorithm for an a priori known desired demand profile for the next day. An overview of demand response (DR) and their different classifications in a deregulated electricity market is discussed in [9] . The authors in [10] compare different bidding rules in wholesale electricity markets and in particular when there exist PEVs and renewables' penetration in the power grid. In [3] , the author discusses how a time-shiftable load, that may comprise of several time-shiftable subloads, can optimally submit its demand bids to DA and RT markets to minimize its electricity procurement cost. Although this paper provides closed-form solutions for biddings, it does not discuss the case when bids are submitted by retailers to electricity markets in distributed systems whereby the retailer does not have detailed information about its customers' preferences due to privacy concerns.
In [11] , charging and discharging of PEVs are controlled in order to maximize the social and individual welfare functions. However, when it comes to normal residential users, it is not very clear and straightforward to seek and assign pertinent utility and welfare functions for the individual users. Paper [12] describes the basic characteristics of PJM's DA and RT electricity markets. The author discusses that economic incentives make the DA and RT market prices converge in the bidding processes. In addition, The locational marginal pricing (LMP) based markets support reliable grid operations by using efficient pricing signals to the retailers. Nevertheless, we should note that sending pricing signals and enabling low electricity consumer's bidding in the markets may cause stability problems for the power system, time of use pricing (ToUP) and real time pricing (RTP) techniques may cause high simultaneity in customers' responses and instability in the power grid by generating unfavourable aggregated load profiles [13] .
In addition, in [14] , the authors investigate the bidding process for DA and RT markets for data centres by taking into account both costs and risks. The authors in [15] model the bidding interactions between a demand response aggregator (DRA) and generators as a Stackelberg game [16] for a DA market wherein the game is one of complete information.
In this paper, we propose a model and a fast converging and decentralized joint demand shaping and altering algorithm for managing PEVs' electricity assignments (charging and discharging) in order to minimize the electricity procurement cost of a retailer bidding to a two-settlement electricity market, i.e., DA and RT markets. We adopt PJM interconnection [4] prices for the year 2014 to evaluate our algorithm's results.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we explain the underlying model of the power system in this paper which entails the energy markets, the electricity retailers or the aggregators, and the users. We articulate different parts of this model in the sequel. normally needs on-demand power supply, e.g. air conditioning, lighting, audio visual devices, cooking and refrigerator, and PEV as a flexible load. In this model, the dotted lines show the underlying information system while the solid lines represent the power transmission and distribution infrastructure.
We assume that an electricity retailer bids to the energy market, e.g., on a DA basis. Then, based on its energy needs and the market state, it buys energy from the market at MCPs. We assume that the retailer is willing to handle its customers' PEVs' electricity assignments such that the shape of its aggregated power demand profile matches the electricity profile resulted from the successful bids in the DA market. This enables the retailer to minimize its demand from the RT market for balancing the load in the following day and accordingly reduce the overall electricity procurement cost. This cost reduction makes the energy retailer afford to offer more attractive deals to the customers in the form of pricing, rewarding, promotions, etc [8] .
However, in practice, it is not guaranteed that the shaped aggregated profile exactly matches the retailer's purchased DA energy profile. Thus, the retailer often needs to reciprocate the load imbalances in the following day by referring to the RT market and buy electricity at RT prices.
On the other hand, we should notice that residential DR is desired to be carried out such that users' privacy is not violated. In such case, we can expect that DR attracts more participation from the users, especially when the main job is implemented in each user's house in a decentralized fashion according to this model.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we first formulate the electricity procurement cost for a retailer bidding to the electricity market and then provide our proposed joint demand profile shaping and altering algorithm.
In our analysis, without loss of generality, we assume a daily scheduling horizon and a time granularity of one hour for electricity markets and the DR. Let (l d , p d ) represents the pair of load l d and price p d vectors which has been cleared in the DA market, i.e.,
for which, the units of l i and p i are MWh and $/MWh, respectively. Similarly, assume that (l r , p r ) represents the pair of load l r and price p r vectors which are the load imbalance and RT price vectors in the following day. The values of the elements of for both these vectors will be only known to the retailer only at each time slot of the next day. Then, the overall electricity procurement cost for the following day can be formulated as follows:
In the above, < x, y > shows the inner product between vectors x and y and C is the overall electricity procurement cost over the scheduling horizon, i. e., 24 hours.
First, given the purchased profile from the DA market by the retailer, i.e., l d , the users individually contribute to follow this demand profile by solving the following sequential optimization problem (see Algorithm 1):
l t PEV,n = 0, ∀t / ∈ T P PEV,n ,
Here, l PEV,n and l A,n show the energy assignment vectors for user n's PEV and the aggregated load from its household appliances, respectively. E PEV,n is the n th user's required energy to be allocated to its PEV which is associated with the total required charging time T PEV,n as follows:
where a is the charging power rate of the outlet to which it is plugged in. Likewise, α n and β n represent the arrival time and departure time of the PEV. Furthermore, |l t PEV,n | ≤ p max limits the maximum power that can be delivered to/from the PEV, we can assume p max = a, and T P PEV,n represents the permissible charging time set or simply the set of time slots during the PEV's connection time to the power grid. This is simply the set of time slots between α n and β n . Additionally, l −n is the aggregated power profile from other N − 1 users in the system which is described as follows:
In (8), C PEV,n is the total storage capacity of the user n's PEV and we assume that in case of employing V2G in the system, PEV's state of charge (SOC) should not fall below 20% of that total capacity in order to make sure that the adverse impacts on PEV's battery lifetime due to complete depletion are avoided. Second, knowing the fact that (l r , p r ) is unknown to the retailer a priori, at each time slot t 0 of the next day after getting this information, the retailer may decide to alter the previously shaped DA demand profile. It may want to minimize its RT electricity purchase to balance the load if the RT prices rise unexpectedly and even sell back some of its pre-purchased electricity from DA market to the RT market by using the PEVs' available demand elasticity. RT prices may fluctuate significantly due to the state of the RT market or contingencies.
As the chances for the price to remain that high during all the next remaining hours of the day is low [5] , reshaping the load profile by lowering the electricity consumption at that time slot and purchasing electricity at the next time slots can yield to a lower electricity procurement cost in practice. This is also true for purchasing electricity at those time slots when price, unexpectedly, falls down significantly. The retailer may buy extra electricity at those specific time slots (based on the overall storage capacity coming from connected PEVs) and reshape the demand for the next hours, c.f., Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 .
We should note that the retailer is assumed to be allowed to employ the existing flexibility (offered by each user's PEV) and the diversity (resulting from the users' different usage patterns). We refer to these two as the system's elasticity. Nevertheless, the electricity consumption behaviours of the users (their PEVs' usage patterns) are not to be changed and hence the algorithm preserves users' comfort. Moreover, users' privacy is not violated as the information about their individual appliances, including PEV, is not revealed.
Then, the following linear multi objective programming (MOP) allows demand altering at time slot t 0 (upon the retailer's request to the subscribers after obtaining price information from RT market) along with pursuing the shape of the pre-purchased electricity from DA market (see Algorithm 1):
[l 1 PEV,n , · · · , l t0−1 PEV,n ] = [l 1 PEV,n , · · · , l t0−1 PEV,n ],
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and (1 − λ) are the weights of the objective functions. In (17), SOC t=t0−1 PEV,n is the SOC of the user n's PEV before time slot t 0 and, similar to P1, we assume that in case of employing V2G in the system, the SOC should not fall below 20% of the total PEV's storage capacity.
The convergence criterion in Algorithm 1 can be simply assumed as a desired number of iterations of updating all users' demand profiles or it can be determined to be lower than some pre-set mean square error (MSE) between two subsequent iterations of achieving aggregated demand profiles. As we have discussed in [8] , the convergence is guaranteed to be obtained. Furthermore, users' contribution can be modelled as a cooperative game with complete information wherein a Nash equilibrium exists [8] .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of the proposed algorithm in the previous section through computer simulations. In our simulations, the number of users, N , is 1,000 and the horizon for testing our algorithm is considered to be a day, i.e., 24 hours for a DA programming scenario with a time granularity of one hour, i.e., each time slot is one hour.
For the PEVs usage patterns, our data and distributions are based on 2009 NHTS data [17] . We considered new standard outlets, NEMA 5-15, with 1.8 kW power transfer limit. Furthermore, SOC for each PEV at the arrival time is as follows in percentage points:
In other words, we assumed that PEVs are needed to be fully charged by their respective next departure time. Additionally, we considered 24 kWh energy storage capacity for all PEVs according to Nissan Leaf model [18] . Moreover, we adopted the PJM interconnection electricity market pricing data for both DA and RT markets in the year 2014 [4] .
Algorithm 1 Joint Demand Shaping & Altering 1: All N users initialize their respective load profiles over the scheduling horizon based on their respective demands, i.e., l n for n = 1, . . . , N. 2: All N users send their initialized load profiles to the retailer. 3: while not reaching convergence do 4: for n = 1 to N do 5: The retailer calculates the state information l −n according to (10) for user n. 6: The retailer sends (l −n − l d ) to user n. 7: User n solves problem P1 and updates its load profile l n . 8: User n sends back the new demand profile to the retailer.
9:
The retailer updates l n . 10: end for 11: end while 12: The retailer receives information from RT market. 13: The retailer finds t 0 . 14: while not reaching convergence do 15: for n = 1 to N do 16: The retailer sends demand altering signal at time slot t 0 to user n.
17:
User n solves problem P2 and updates its load profile l n .
18:
User n sends back the new demand profile to the retailer. 19: The retailer updates l n .
20:
The retailer calculates the state information l −n according to (10) for user n. Fig. 5 shows the DA and RT prices for 9 March 2014 as an example. We chose this day since it had the highest unexpected peaks in RT prices throughout that year in PJM interconnection and can be assumed as what we earlier referred to as a black swan event in the market. As it can be observed, the RT price has a substantial peak at 9 A.M. around which the price is still unexpectedly high for 5 hours. Hence, the retailer can choose to proceed for demand altering program P2 upon receiving this pricing information at t 0 = 9.
It is important to stress that the amount of success in demand altering depends on the availability of PEVs at users' dwellings which is dissimilar for different hours of a day and different days of a week, see Fig. 6 .
Next, we examine the DR scheme introduced in Algorithm 1. Fig. 7 shows the electricity demand profile from only typical household appliances, i.e., without PEVs, and the overall electricity demand profile when users use PEVs with different usage patterns based on NHTS data.
We assume that Fig. 8 shows the electricity profile purchased by the retailer from the DA market. In other words, it shows the bids that could be cleared in the market for different hours of the following day. The results of Algorithm 1 for shaping the demand profile and joint shaping and altering the demand is depicted in Fig. 9 . For this, we assumed λ = 0.5 in 12. It can be observed that at 9 A.M. when the highest RT price occurs, demand altering can reduces the aggregated demand from 948.2 kWh to 599.3 kWh, i.e., we can obtain almost %37 reduction in the overall demand. In our simulations, convergence has been attained only after one single iteration of updating all users' electricity demand profiles for both P1 and P2 in Algorithm 1.
It should be emphasized that this could be achieved since at that hour of the day we had almost 330 V2G enabled PEVs available at users' dwellings. Different results would be obtained for the other hours of that day. Also, it is obvious that the amount of cost savings would be dissimilar on weekdays and in the weekend.
In Table I , we compare the overall electricity procurement costs for the retailer for two cases: case 1) when there is no PEV in the system and case 2) when all the users possess PEVs with their respective usage patterns.
It can be noticed that in case 1, if the retailer could be absolutely successful in bidding to the DA market, i.e., there would not be any need to purchase electricity from the RT market (ideal occasion), the overall cost is only $674.4, for the pricing shown in Fig. 5 . In a more realistic case, when the retailer's bidding to the DA market is assumed to be according Fig. 8 , and the retailer is required to balance the load, the overall cost is remarkably higher. Obviously, demand shaping and demand altering in this case are not applicable (N/A) as there is no PEV and hence no power demand elasticity in the system.
For the second case, when users possess PEVs, for the ideal bidding, the overall cost increases by almost 37% to supply electricity to the PEVs whereas for the realistic bidding it becomes more than double. When demand shaping P1 is employed, this overall cost reduces by around 18%. Furthermore, when joint demand shaping and altering in Algorithm 1 is used, cost decreases further by almost 10%. In this case, we also assumed that the retailer is allowed to sell back its extra load purchased earlier from the DA market to the RT market at the same RT prices. This happens a few times in that day such as at 4 P.M.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a fast converging and decentralized joint demand shaping and altering algorithm for managing V2G enabled PEVs' electricity assignments (charging and discharging) to reduce the overall electricity procurement cost for an electricity retailer. Our proposed algorithm uses demand shaping and demand altering for the DA and the RT markets, respectively. In particular, when the power system has high penetration of intermittent energy resources, demand altering is crucial due to likely contingencies and hence more RT price fluctuations. In our simulations' results, we considered a specific day in 2014 which had high unexpected RT prices for some hours in PJM interconnection electricity market. We showed that significant overall cost savings (up to 28%) for a retailer bidding to this electricity market can be achieved by using our proposed algorithm. This cost saving allows the retailer to offer better deals to the customers and expand its market capacity. Therefore, customers can enjoy lower electricity bills as well.
The work presented in this paper can be extended in various ways. First, the overall amount of flexibility offered by PEVs for demand altering throughout different hours of a day can be calculated. Second, the retailer can optimally find a price threshold based on which it proceeds for demand altering. This can be done via stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) and data mining. Third, recently, PEVs' battery storage capacity has been expanded up to 60-85 kWh, e.g., for Tesla model S and model X [19] , which can provide much more elasticity for demand shaping and demand altering and hence reduce the electricity costs further. Finally, the values for λ in P2 can be investigated for different hours of the day as the algorithm proceeds toward the end of the day and λ needs to be adjusted accordingly. We are addressing all these points together with some more detailed analyses in the follow up journal paper of this work.
